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The cost of enforcing contracts is a key determinant of market performance. We document this point with 
reference to the credit market. We start by presenting a model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts. 
According to the model, improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit rationing and increase lending, while 
have an ambiguous effect on interest rates, depending on banking competition and on the type of judicial reform. 
These predictions are supported by panel data on Italian provinces and by cross-country evidence. In Italian 
provinces with longer trials or large backlogs of pending trials, credit is less widely available than elsewhere. 
International evidence also shows that the depth of mortgage markets is inversely related to costs of mortgage 
foreclosure and other proxies for judicial inefficiency. 
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A borrower may default on a loan because he is unable (accidental default) or because, 
though potentially solvent, he is unwilling to repay (strategic default). Besides being 
intrinsically different, inability and unwillingness to repay depend on totally different factors. 
A borrower is unable to repay if his project fails, which may in turn depend on bad luck, 
incompetence, poor effort in managing the project, or a combination of all three factors. 
  A solvent borrower may be unwilling to repay if the gain from defaulting is greater 
than the perceived cost of the presumed sanctions. The perceived cost of these sanctions does 
not depend only on the lender’s willingness to inflict them, but on the entire set of 
institutional arrangements governing the credit market. The law and its enforcement by the 
judiciary are central to these arrangements. Historically, countries have developed different 
legal systems, which feature varying degrees of protection of creditors’ rights. But even 
countries with similar legal rules may enforce them to a differing extent, depending on the 
efficiency and honesty of their judiciary. And even within the same country, the efficiency of 
courts can vary a great deal, depending on the allocation of resources and the geographical 
distribution of the “demand for contract enforcement.” 
  By affecting the borrower’s future willingness to pay, these features help determine 
the ex ante willingness of creditors to extend loans, and the terms they will ask. By the same 
token, they determine the effectiveness of credit markets in intermediating and allocating 
saving among alternative users. 
This paper explores the impact of the judicial enforcement of debt contracts on the 
amount of lending, interest rates and default rates theoretically and empirically. We present a 
model of opportunistic debtors and inefficient courts. Judicial efficiency is measured by the 
fraction of inside or outside collateral that lenders can expect to recover from an insolvent 
borrower at the end of a trial. According to the model, an improvement in judicial efficiency 
unambiguously increases aggregate lending, by opening the credit market to borrowers with 
little collateral. The impact of judicial efficiency on the average interest rate is ambiguous, in 
                                                 
1 This double curse about the slowness of trials and the difficulty of obtaining damages once they are awarded is 
drawn from the Financial Times, Weekend December 12/13 1998, p. 3.   1 
that this depends on the structure of the credit market (competitive or monopolistic) and on 
the specific judicial reform (improvement in the recovery of inside or outside collateral).  
We then test these predictions empirically, using two data sets. The first is a specially 
designed Italian panel on interest rates, lending, overdrafts, default rates, and indicators of 
judicial efficiency in each province. The second is a cross-country sample of mortgage 
lending, downpayment ratios and interest rates, plus measures of the cost and length of 
foreclosure procedures. 
The evidence from both data sets is that judicial enforcement is important to the 
performance of credit markets. Our findings are that judicial efficiency correlates positively 
with the volume of lending and negatively with proxies for credit rationing. These results 
obtain also when in our panel data estimates we control for unobserved heterogeneity among 
judicial districts via fixed effects. The correlation with average interest rates and default rates 
is ambiguous, in line with the prediction of the model. 
  With the help of a simple illustrative model, in Section 2 we discuss the theoretical 
channels through which judicial efficiency can affect credit market performance. In Section 3 
we present our province-level data and the corresponding regression results. Section 4 gives 
the international evidence on mortgage loan markets. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. A Model of Judicial Enforcement and Credit Markets 
 
The key function of courts in credit relationships is to force solvent borrowers to repay when 
they fail to do so spontaneously. Hence poor judicial enforcement will increase opportunistic 
behavior on the part of borrowers: anticipating that creditors will be unable to recover their 
loans easily and cheaply via the courts, borrowers will be tempted to default. Lenders respond 
by reducing the availability of credit.  
We illustrate how judicial inefficiency affects credit market performance in a model of 
risk-neutral banks facing a continuum of potential borrowers. Each borrower i has no liquid 
wealth but owns illiquid collateral  i C . He can invest in a project requiring a loan of size  i L , 
so that his collateral-loan ratio is  i i i L C c / º . Projects succeed with common probability p 
and fail with probability  p - 1 . All successful projects yield  p + 1  per unit invested, and   2 
failed projects yield zero. All projects have positive net present value (NPV), that is, their 
expected profitability exceeds the banks’ cost of raising funds, r : 
r p + > + 1 ) 1 ( p .  
Since  r  is also the opportunity cost of capital for entrepreneurs, all of them would like to 
undertake their projects. 
Banks can observe whether projects succeed or fail, so that there is no asymmetric 
information.
2 In either case the borrower can dispute the bank’s claim. In case of dispute, the 
bank can attempt to recover the loan in court. But it will recover only a fraction  p f  of the 
project's revenue
3 and a fraction  c f  of the collateral. The parameters  p f  and  c f  can be 
regarded as indicators of judicial efficiency. Both range from 0 (no enforcement) to 1 (perfect 
enforcement). 
There are two possible interpretations of this assumption. First, by disputing the 
repayment and forcing the lender to go to court, the borrower retains a fraction of the loan 
i c p c ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( f p f - + + -  in case of success, and  i c c ) 1 ( f -  in case of failure. Since he can 
pocket part of the firm’s revenue or consume part of the collateral, he has a clear incentive for 
opportunistic behavior. He will always dispute the lender's claim, whether the project has 
succeeded or failed. 
A second interpretation is that these resources are not retained by the borrower, but 
dissipated by the judicial process itself (legal fees, mismanagement of the company during the 
trial, bribes taken by corrupt officials, etc.). In this interpretation, judicial costs effectively 
operate as a tax on credit transactions. In principle, this tax can be avoided by settling out of 
court, two parties having to agree on how to split the resources that they would have 
otherwise wasted. If judicial costs are borne entirely by the lender, the borrower will make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to repay  i c P c f p f + + ) 1 (  per dollar lent in case of success, and  i cc f  
in case of failure. The lender will be indifferent between accepting this offer and taking the 
borrower to court. In this case, the borrower retains the entire cost of the trial, and the two 
alternative interpretations lead exactly to the same outcome. If judicial costs are more evenly 
                                                 
2 The model can also effectively capture the case where the lender cannot observe the outcome of the project. In 
this case, the borrower will always claim that the project has failed. Anticipating this, the lender will extend 
credit only if repayment is guaranteed by collateral. In the model, this case would obtain with fp=0. 
3 The subscript p stands for “project”, since in this case the project itself acts as inside collateral.   3 
distributed between the two parties, the borrower could keep only part of the cost of the trial. 
Even so, he will generally have an incentive to dispute the amount owed and thereby extract 
that portion from the lender.
4  
In short, borrowers reckon that lenders will be able to recover at most  i c p c f p f + + ) 1 ( 
per unit lent in case of success, and  i cc f  otherwise. Thus the lending rate charged to borrower 
i,  i r , cannot exceed the limit: 
i c p i c r f p f + + £ + ) 1 ( 1 . (1) 
All banks know the success probability p, the projects’ profitability p, the judicial 
efficiency parameters  p f  and  c f , and the individual borrower’s collateral-loan ratio ci.  
 
2.1 Competitive Banks 
 
In equilibrium, expected profits are zero, so that the cost of funds equals the expected return 
per unit lent to borrower i: 
] , 1 min[ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 i c i i c r p r p r f + - + + = + . (2) 
The last term states that when the project fails the lender recovers only a fraction of the 
collateral if this falls short of the principal plus interest due. Equation (2) defines the break-
even interest rate  i r  charged to each borrower: 
) , 1 min(
1 1
























= . (4) 
                                                 
4 If lenders bear only a fraction g of judicial costs, the borrower’s take-it-or-leave-it offer will be accordingly 
reduced to [] [] i c p c ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 f g p f g - - + + - -  in case of success and to [] i c c ) 1 ( 1 f g - -  in case of failure. The 
feasibility condition (1) and all subsequent expressions must be redefined accordingly. All the comparative 
statics concerning an improvement in judicial efficiency are qualitatively unchanged.   4 
The minimum level of collateral in equation (4) is obtained by substituting (1) (taken with 
equality) into equation (3). Banks do not finance entrepreneurs with collateral-loan ratio 
below  min c , even though with internal financing their projects would be profitable. Thus  
min c  defines the region of credit rationing. This is due only to judicial inefficiency: with 
efficient courts ( 1 = = p c f f ) all entrepreneurs would have access to credit.
5  
The zero-profit condition (3) defines two lending regions. If  i i c r c + >1 f , collateral is 
large enough that loans are safe and competition equates the lending rate to the cost of capital. 









In the second region,  i i c r c + <1 f  or equivalently  c ci < : collateral is not sufficient to 
shield the bank completely from loss if the project fails. To break even, the bank must offset 
this expected loss with a higher interest rate in case of success: from the standpoint of the 
bank, collateral and lending rates are substitutes. Therefore, for  c c c i < < min , the zero-profit 
condition (3) defines a negative linear relation between the collateral-loan ratio  i c and the 
lending rate  i r . This is plotted as the segment AB in Figure 1. To the left of point A, there is 
credit rationing. To the right of point B, the lending rate equals the cost of capital. 
All entrepreneurs will borrow, since their participation constraint is always met. To see 
this, note that the expected utility level of borrower i is: 
[] [] ) , 1 min( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i c i i i i i c r c p r c p u f p + - - + + - + + =  (6) 
[] [ ] c c c p r p
c c c r p
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If the individual i does not borrow, however, his utility is just the collateral  i c . Using 
equations (3) and (6), the participation constraint  i i c u ³  reduces to  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ³ + - + r p p . 
Given the assumption that NPV > 0, this condition is always met. 
                                                 
5 Recall the positive-NPV condition  r p + > + 1 ) 1 ( p . Then, setting  1 = = p c f f  in equation (4) implies a 
negative  min c .   5 
Now consider an improvement in judicial efficiency. This can take two forms: an 
increase in  c f  or in  p f , the fractions of external and internal collateral that lenders can 
recover. We examine these two cases in turn. 
An increase in  c f  shifts the downward-sloping portion of the zero-profit locus inward 
from AB to A'B'. The minimum collateral declines to the level corresponding to A', and the 
region of credit rationing shrinks: the improvement in judicial efficiency turns some loss-
making loans into viable ones. Borrowers with collateral ratios between  min c  and c  already 
had access to credit, but now they pay less interest. Therefore, for any given borrower i, the 
interest rate either decreases or stays unchanged. However, the average lending rate may also 
increase depending on how the composition of the borrowers’ pool changes as the credit 
market expands. The effect on the average rate is negative when initially there is no credit 
rationing. This effect is attenuated and can even change sign depending on how many initially 
excluded borrowers gain access to credit when f increases.
6 
Next, consider an increase in  p f . In this case the downward-sloping portion of the 
zero-profit locus in Figure 2 expands from AB to A'B. As a consequence, the region of credit 
rationing shrinks and lending increases, in contrast with the previous experiment. The rates 
charged to those who were already borrowing are unchanged. To understand this difference, 
consider that in Figure 1 the increase in  c f  implies that borrowers effectively pledge more 
external collateral. Since the latter is a substitute for the interest rate, competition forces 
banks to lower rates. In Figure 2, instead, borrowers can pledge more internal collateral, 
which protects the bank only when the project succeeds. But for borrowers who were not 
credit-rationed, banks were already protected by inside collateral in case of success, so the 
zero-profit interest rate is unaffected. Borrowers who were previously rationed now have 
access to credit at a higher interest rate, since raising the rate is the only way the bank can 
exploit the increased inside collateral. Thus, unlike an increase in  c f , an increase in 
p f always increases the average lending rate. 
                                                 
6 To see this, consider two examples. If borrowers’ collateral-loan ratios are uniformly distributed between 
min c  and c , the average interest rate can be shown to decrease. Suppose instead that there are two groups of 
potential borrowers, A and B. Group A is a fraction q of the population and has collateral-loan ratio  c cA ³ . 
Group B has collateral-loan ratio  min c cB <  and is drawn into the credit market after the increase in judicial 
efficiency. It is immediately clear that in this second example the average interest rate increases from its initial   6 
So far we have considered the probability of success as an exogenous parameter p 
common to all entrepreneurs: by assumption, judicial efficiency does not affect the default 
rate 1-p. But in general the probability of a project's success is endogenous, being determined 
by entrepreneurial effort to avoid default. Consider a situation where lenders can observe (and 
contract upon) the entrepreneur’s effort to avoid default, pi. In Appendix 1, we show that in 
this case judicial efficiency tends to raise the average default rate, although it leaves the 
individual default probability unaffected. More specifically, the average default rate increases 
whenever there are some entrepreneurs who were denied credit before the judicial reform. 
The reason is that a more efficient judiciary reduces the region of credit rationing, opening the 
market to lower-grade borrowers.
7 The deterioration of the borrower pool due to this 
endogenous response of pi tends to raise the average interest rate, acting through a channel 
that is absent when p is exogenous. In the case of an increase in  p f  this effect reinforces the 
increase in the average interest rate. In the case of an increase in  c f , it expands the region of 
parameters for which the average interest rate increases.  
To summarize, under perfect competition an improvement in judicial efficiency reduces 
credit rationing and increases lending. It can also increase the average default rate if there was 
prior credit rationing. The effect on interest rates depends on the specifics of the reform: 
better recovery of external collateral ( c f ) has ambiguous effects, while better recovery of 
internal collateral ( p f ) raises interest rates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
level  r . 
7 The judicial reform may also raise the default rate via another channel. Banks are more protected by collateral 
in case of default, and so have less incentive to screen (collateral and screening being substitutes from their point 
of view). Less screening will increase the riskiness of their loans and the average default rate, as shown by 
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2000).   7 
2.2 Monopoly 
 
To explore the effects of judicial reform in non-competitive credit markets, consider a 
situation in which the credit market is geographically segmented and banks are local 
monopolists. Since we assume that the demand for credit is inelastic, the monopolist extracts 
from borrower i the entire surplus, setting: 
i c i p i c r f p f + + = + ) 1 ( 1 , for  [] max min,c c ci Î , (7) 
where  min c  is given by equation (4). The maximum collateral  max c  that a borrower is willing 
to pledge is obtained by substituting equation (7) into the participation constraint: 






f p ) 1 )( 1 (
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= . (8) 
The interest rate that corresponds to this collateral level is  ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( 1 max p p r p + - + = + f p . 
Equation (7) shows that, in contrast to the competitive case, under monopoly there is a 
positive correlation between the lending rate and the collateral-loan ratio. With no 
competition, the bank can charge higher rates to those who pledge more collateral. The 
correlation between ri and ci is graphed as the line AB in Figure 3. As under competition, if 
the collateral-loan ratio is lower than  min c no credit is granted.  
Figure 3 illustrates that an increase in  c f  shifts the AB locus upward and to the left. 
The new locus A'B' features lower  min c  and  max c . So the credit-rationing region shrinks and 
lending increases, as under competition. Lending rates rises for all borrowers. An increase in 
c f  effectively raises the pledgeable portion of collateral and so enables the bank to extract a 
higher surplus by raising interest rates. In Figure 4 we repeat the analysis for an increase in 
p f . In this case, the interest rate locus has a parallel upward shift, with similar qualitative 
effects. In short, under monopoly an improvement in judicial efficiency reduces credit 
rationing, increases lending and raises interest rates.   8 
3. Evidence from a Panel of Judicial Districts 
 
The model illustrates that improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit rationing and 
increase aggregate lending. Interest rates can either rise or fall, depending on the competitive 
structure of the banking sector and on the specific channel through which judicial reforms 
enhance enforcement. We now bring empirical evidence to bear on these issues. In this 
section, we use panel data on lending to firms, credit rationing and interest rates in Italian 





To study the relationship between judicial efficiency and credit market performance, we 
merge indicators of efficiency for 27 judicial districts with credit market data for 95 Italian 
provinces. 
We rely on two indicators of judicial efficiency, using data from the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The first indicator is the length of ordinary civil trials from 
1984 to 1998. It measures the time elapsing between the date of initial recording of a trial and 
that of the court sentence, for actions requiring adjudication of substantive rights concerning 
credit and commercial matters: loans, sale of real estate or goods, rentals, negotiable and 
quasi-negotiable instruments, and insurance.
8 Enforcement cost is directly related to the 
length of the judicial process. A long trial increases legal expenses and, for disputed loans, the 
interest income forgone when collateral does not cover judicial costs. Moreover, during the 
trial, the creditor is exposed to the danger of asset substitution by the debtor and to 
unexpected changes in the value of collateral. 
The second indicator of judicial efficiency is the number of civil suits pending per 
thousand inhabitants. It refers to all actions requiring adjudication of substantive rights, 
including appeal trials, from 1984 to 1998. The stock of trials pending is a key determinant of 
                                                 
8 A narrower classification of legal actions (e.g., loans only) produces too few observations for each district-year 
cell to compute reliable indicators of judicial efficiency. For the same reason we do not consider the length of 
appeals civil cases and bankruptcy procedures.    9 
the duration of future trials; the two indicators are strongly correlated. 
Our indicators of judicial efficiency vary considerably with judicial district and over 
time. The two graphs in Figure 5 display the national averages. The length of trials doubles 
from 26.3 months in 1984 to 52.9 in 1998. The number of trials pending per 1000 inhabitants 
increases from 23.4 in 1984 to 37.9 in 1996, then edging down to 35.7 in 1998. These trends 
may be explained by increasing assignment of judges and resources to criminal justice, to the 
increasing number and complexity of civil laws, and to litigation. 
The graphs in Figure 6 break down the time series of the two indicators geographically. 
Trials are longer and backlogs are larger in the South and the Islands than in the North and 
Center. While the difference in the length of trials across regions is roughly constant, the 
backlog shows widening geographical disparities. In 1984 the number of trials pending was 
20 in the North and 27 in the South; in 1998, 23 in the North and 44 in the South. 
Furthermore, the North shows more marked signs of improvement after 1993, when its 
backlog peaked at 27.4. 
The bottom graphs in Figures 5 and 6, then, show that both the average number and the 
dispersion of trials pending increased between 1984 and 1998. In a panel regression 
framework, variability of the length of trials between different years and different districts is 
crucial to identify the effect of judicial efficiency on credit market performance. 
Both of our indicators may suffer from measurement error. The cases used to measure 
length include many disputes on matters other than credit. The stock of trials pending refers to 
the even broader aggregate of all civil cases. Indirect evidence on the reliability of these 
indicators comes from a 1994 survey of 269 Italian banks, representing 90 per cent of total 
loans.
9 The survey was designed by the Bank of Italy to gather information on credit recovery 
costs and procedures (both judicial and non-judicial), in the presence of insolvent borrowers. 
It allows us to compare our measures of judicial efficiency, which are based on ISTAT data, 
with the bank's own assessment of the length of the judicial procedures by region. Since the 
survey refers to 1994, we aggregate the ISTAT district-level judicial data by region (20 in 
total, with 1 to 9 provinces each) and relate the resulting measures to the self-reported 
indicator. 
Figure 7 shows that the length of trials and the stock of trials pending based on ISTAT 
                                                 
9 Generale and Gobbi (1996) describe the survey and its main findings.   10 
data correlate positively with the bank's reports. The self-reported measure of the length of 
trial has a 0.79 correlation with the ISTAT measure of the same variable (statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level) and a 0.45 correlation with the ISTAT-based backlog 
(significant at the 5 percent level). We take this as evidence that the two ISTAT-based 
indicators of judicial efficiency used in our empirical analysis track lenders’ perceived credit 
collection costs reasonably well.
10 
We merge these indicators of judicial efficiency with measures of credit market 
performance: outstanding loans, indicators of credit rationing, interest rates on short-term 
loans to non-financial companies, ratio of non-performing to total loans and the Herfindhal 
index of loan concentration. 
Loans granted is total lending to domestic companies in each province divided by 
provincial GDP. Credit rationing is proxied by the proportion of overdrawn credit lines to 
non-financial firms in each province, that is, lines for which credit is drawn above the amount 
initially granted by the bank. This is widely regarded as a good indicator of the “tightness” of 
the credit market because the cost of credit rises steeply when firms overdraw. Interest rates 
are provincial averages weighted by loans. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is 
a proxy of the default rate. All these variables are drawn from the database of the Italian 
public credit register (Centrale dei Rischi: see Appendix 2 for details on data sources and 
definitions). They are aggregated, for the 95 Italian provinces, from 1984 to 1995.  
Table 1 reports unweighted provincial averages of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis for three sub-periods. The total number of observations is 1,140 (95 provinces for 12 
years). The ratio of total outstanding lending to GDP increases from 31 to 41 percent. Credit 
rationing also increased, possibly a reflection of monetary policy tightening during Italy’s 
run-up to the European Monetary Union. Both the lending rate and the T-bill rate decline over 
the sample period, reflecting disinflation. The differential between the two also narrows from 
5 to 3.6 percentage points. The Herfindhal index declines from 17 to 15 percent, revealing 
increased competition in the loan market. 
 
                                                 
10 The self-reported indicator cannot be directly used in our regression analysis because it is available for only 
one year. Therefore, this variable is not identified in a panel data framework.   11 
3.2. Descriptive Evidence 
 
Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 report evidence on the relation between credit market performance 
and judicial efficiency in the various judicial districts. Averages are taken over the 1984-95 
period. Figure 8 indicates that the district average amount of lending is negatively correlated 
with the length of trials in a district and with the stock of trials pending. The correlation is 
statistically different from zero at standard significance levels. For instance, in a relatively 
efficient judicial district like Venice where trials last slightly more than 30 months and there 
are about 22 pending trials per 1000 inhabitants, lending is over 40 percent of GDP. In 
Reggio Calabria, where length exceeds 50 months and the backlog is about 50 trials per 1000 
inhabitants, lending is equal to just 10 percent of GDP. 
Figure 9 indicates that where trials are longer and the judicial backlog is heavier, our 
indicator of credit rationing is also higher: moving from Venice to Reggio Calabria, it 
approximately doubles. In Figure 10 we relate the interest rate spread (the difference between 
the lending rate and the T-bill rate) to the same indicators of judicial efficiency. Both 
correlation coefficients are positive and statistically different from zero at standard 
significance levels. The spread is more than 200 basis points greater in the least than in the 
most efficient districts. Figure 11 shows that, like the spread, the non-performing loan ratio is 
higher where courts are less efficient. 
This descriptive evidence suggests that judicial efficiency is associated with a larger 
amount of lending, less credit rationing and lower interest rates, in accord with the model of 
Section 1 assuming banking competition. However, these relations could be spurious, because 
so far we have not controlled for other determinants of credit market performance. 
Furthermore, the cross-sectional evidence does not exploit the time-series dimension of the 
data set. As we shall see, this feature allows us to control not only for other covariates, but 
also for unobserved heterogeneity at the provincial level. Therefore, we turn to regression 
analysis. 
 
3.3. Regression Analysis 
 
In our regression analysis we relate lending, fraction of firms with overdraft loans, interest   12 
rates and non-performing loans to length of trials and judicial backlog, controlling for credit 
market concentration, provincial GDP, calendar-year effects, and - in some specifications - 
provincial effects. Other things equal, we expect market concentration to reduce lending and 
raise interest rates, reflecting a less competitive credit market and possibly closer bank-firm 
relations, a further channel for higher interest rates and less lending according to Petersen and 
Rajan (1995). One would expect a larger GDP to increase the demand for loans and thereby 
raise interest rates. To avoid endogeneity, the GDP variable is lagged. Calendar-year 
dummies control for the effect of aggregate shocks on the credit market. 
The upper panel of Table 2 reports OLS estimates, while the lower panel reports fixed-
effect estimates, which control for unobserved heterogeneity at the province level. In the OLS 
regressions, the length of trials and the size of the backlog are associated with less lending, 
more overdraft loans, wider spreads and higher default rates. Each of these effects is 
statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level, and all are in keeping with the 
descriptive evidence of the previous section. In economic terms, moreover, the coefficients 
are very large. For instance, increasing the length of trials by 1 year is associated with a fall in 
the lending-GDP ratio of almost 7 percentage points and a 2-point increase in the percentage 
of firms with overdraft credit. An extra 10 trials pending per 1000 inhabitants is associated 
with a reduction of 4 percentage points in the lending ratio and an increase of over 2 in the 
overdraft percentage. The positive correlation between efficient judicial districts, lending and 
overdraft credit dovetails with the prediction of the model, insofar as overdrafts proxy for 
credit rationing. 
The Herfindhal index is positively correlated with lending, interest rates and default 
rates, and is negatively correlated with the percentage of firms using overdraft credit, 
although the coefficient is statistically different from zero only for interest rates. This is 
consistent with previous studies of the Italian credit market based on individual loan contract 
data.
11 In general, the GDP coefficients are not statistically different from zero.  
These results are subject to the objection that judicial efficiency could be correlated 
with omitted variables at the provincial level, such as credit risk or the efficiency of banks. 
The fixed-effect regressions reported in the lower panel of Table 2 control for such 
unobserved heterogeneity, provided that the variation of judicial efficiency in each province 
                                                 
11 See De Bonis and Ferrando (1997), D’Auria and Foglia (1997) and Sapienza (1997).   13 
over time is not correlated with that of these omitted variables. As one would expect, the 
impact of judicial efficiency on all the credit market variables is much attenuated compared 
with the OLS estimates and the descriptive evidence of the previous section. 
However, the coefficient of the stock of trials pending maintains the same sign and 
remains significant in both the lending and the overdraft regressions. An additional 10 trials 
pending per 1000 inhabitants is associated with a reduction of 1.5 points in the lending-GDP 
ratio and an increase of 1 point in the percentage of firms with overdraft loans. Judicial 
backlog correlates negatively with the interest rate spread and with non-performing loans, 
overturning the descriptive evidence of Figures 10 and 11 and the OLS estimates, but this is 
quite reasonable in the framework of our model. Recall that in the model judicially less 
efficient districts may have lower average interest rates under competition, and should have 
lower rates under monopoly. Moreover, with the default rate endogenous, the model also 
predicts that they will be lower in the less efficient districts. 
A caveat is that if the judicial process is excessively long or costly, private parties may 
bypass the courts for alternative forms of dispute settlement. The substitution of out-of-court 
settlement could be particularly significant in bankruptcies, suggesting that the relation 
between credit conditions and judicial enforcement may be non-linear. For short or moderate 
trials times, credit market performance (loans, interest rates, and so forth) respond to our 
indicators of judicial efficiency. Since beyond a critical length the relation between judicial 
efficiency and credit market performance may weaken or disappear, we introduce quadratic 
terms in the indicators of judicial efficiency in the specification of Table 2, but these prove to 
be not statistically different from zero. 
To summarize, the econometric estimates obtained controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity via province-level fixed effects confirm only part of the descriptive evidence of 
Figures 7 to 11. According to the estimates, the judicial districts with better legal enforcement 
display more lending activity and less credit rationing.  These results are consistent with the 
model of Section 2, which predicts that judicial efficiency will increase lending and decrease 
credit rationing under competition and monopoly alike. On the whole, the estimates suggest 
that the correlation of judicial efficiency with interest rates and default rates is less robust. 
Again, this is in line with the model’s predictions. 
These results are also consistent with the findings of studies of other countries and 
markets. Castelar Pineiro and Cabral (2001) and Cristini, Moya and Powell (2001) analyze   14 
how local variations in the effectiveness of the legal system in Argentina and Brazil have 
affected the development of credit markets. They find less lending and more non-performing 
loans in provinces or states with poor enforcement. Similar results are reported for household 
credit in the U.S. and Italy. In the United States, Meador (1982) and Jaffee (1985) found that 
mortgage interest rates were generally higher in states where the foreclosure process was 
longer and more costly. In Italy, Fabbri and Padula (2001) find that households located in 




4. International Evidence on Mortgage Markets 
 
The market for mortgage loans is a potentially fruitful testing ground for the effects of the 
quality of judicial enforcement. First, this market is relatively homogeneous internationally, 
so that comparison is meaningful. Second, in the mortgage market an indicator of credit 
rationing is readily available: namely, the minimum down payment ratio. Finally, the 
performance of mortgage markets can be related to a set of indicators of the effectiveness of 
foreclosure procedures, available for a good number of industrialized countries. 
The first three columns of Table 3 report the ratio of outstanding mortgage lending to 
GDP, the down payment ratio, and the spread between the lending and the borrowing rate in 
fourteen countries. Mortgage markets differ widely. In Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Finland, the market is well developed, and the down payment is 
relatively low. In other countries (Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain) the market is relatively 
thin and the down payment ratio is high. 
The spread between borrowing and lending rates is an important indicator of mortgage 
market imperfections. Per se, a spread is not inconsistent with equilibrium models: it can stem 
from transaction costs or imperfect competition, and is negatively correlated with the 
equilibrium supply of loans. However, the presence of a spread is also consistent with 
asymmetric information or opportunistic behavior by borrowers. In these alternative models, 
there is no necessary relation between the spread and the supply of loans. For instance, in the 
model developed in Section 2 the spread is due to a particular form of transaction cost 
(judicial inefficiency), but it can widen as well as narrow following judicial improvement.   15 
In our sample of fourteen countries, differences in spreads are relatively small, while 
the variation in mortgage lending is huge. The spread ranges only from –2.3 percentage points 
in Spain (a country with comparatively low mortgage debt) to about 1.5 points in Italy and 
Austria (also with low levels of debt) and the United States (which has the largest mortgage 
debt). In short, there is simply no correlation between the spread and the size of the mortgage 
market. By contrast, the down payment ratio exhibits considerable variability. It is highest in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, which unsurprisingly also have 
comparatively small mortgage markets.
12 The lack of correlation between the spread and the 
volume of lending (coefficient of 0.04) and the strong, negative correlation of the down 
payment ratio to volume (-0.63) are consistent with the model of Section 2. 
Cross-country variability in the volume of mortgage lending, down payment ratios and 
interest rate spreads can be traced both to supply factors, including the cost and speed of 
foreclosure procedures, and to demand factors and regulation. Key demand factors are 
household earnings profiles, the age structure of the population, ownership preference, tax 
incentives for homeownership and debt, and intergenerational transfers. Regulation often 
imposes interest rate controls and minimum down payment ratios (until 1986 it was 50 
percent in Italy). Here the analysis is descriptive, and we focus on international differences in 
judicial enforcement to explain the different performance of mortgage markets, without 
controlling for these additional factors. 
Section 2 emphasizes that differences in the cost of repossessing and liquidating 
collateral can affect the performance of credit markets. Table 4 reports three indicators of 
judicial efficiency in the various countries. The first is a survey-based general assessment of 
the quality of judicial enforcement. The others are the length and the average cost of 
foreclosures on home mortgage loans.  
On the basis of these indicators, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain feature more costly 
and slower procedures, and less efficient judicial systems in general.
13 The Italian case stands 
                                                 
12 Chiuri and Jappelli (2001) explore the determinants of the international pattern of home ownership using the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a set of microeconomic data which they merge with aggregate panel data on 
mortgage loans and down payment ratios for fourteen OECD countries. After controlling for demographic 
characteristics, country effects, cohort effects and time effects, they find strong evidence that the availability of 
mortgage finance – as measured by outstanding mortgage lending and down payment ratios - affects the age-
profile of home ownership, especially at the young end. 
13 The three indicators of judicial efficiency are strongly correlated. For instance, duration correlates negatively 
with efficiency and positively with legal expense (see Table 4).   16 
out. Consistent with the data reported in Section 3, debt collection and repossession in case of 
foreclosure is very costly and time-consuming. It takes between 3 and 5 years to repossess, 
and legal expenses for foreclosure can be as high as 20 percent of the price. At the other 
extreme, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom have rapid 
mortgage foreclosure (one year or less, with a minimum of 2-3 months in the Netherlands) 
and much cheaper procedures. 
Figure 12 plots the ratio of mortgage lending to GDP against two of our three indicators 
(duration of foreclosure and overall judicial efficiency). The size of the mortgage market 
correlates negatively with duration and positively with judicial efficiency: that is, the 
countries with better judicial systems also feature the broadest mortgage markets. Figure 13 
suggests that judicial efficiency correlates negatively with down payment ratios, duration 
positively. That is, the countries with better judicial systems also have less credit rationing. 
Figure 14 shows that the spread correlates negatively with duration and positively with 
efficiency. That is, in countries with better judicial systems interest rates on loans are 
relatively higher.
14 The patterns of Figures 12, 13 and 14 are summarized by the correlation 
matrix reported in Table 4. The correlations of lending volume and down payments with the 
three judicial efficiency indicators are statistically different from zero at standard significance 
levels. For spreads, only the positive correlation with the overall index of judicial efficiency is 
statistically different from zero. 
The descriptive evidence reported in this section suggests that enforcement problems 
may be at the roots of the international differences in mortgage lending and in downpayment 
ratios. The evidence is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and with our 
findings for the panel of Italian provinces. It is also consistent with the findings of other 
recent papers based on cross-country data. La Porta et al. (1997) consider indicators of 
creditor protection, origin of the legal system and respect of the law to explain the private 
                                                 
14 In contrast to the international comparison, some studies of mortgage markets in the United States report 
evidence that the cost of legal enforcement increases the cost of credit. Meador (1982) and Jaffee (1985) find 
that mortgage interest rates were generally higher in states where the law extended the length and expense of the 
foreclosure process. Similarly, Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) document that in states with more generous 
bankruptcy exemptions low-wealth households receive less credit and are charged higher interest rates. Alston 
(1984) reports that farm foreclosure moratorium laws in the 1930s led to fewer farm loans and to higher interest 
rates in the states that enacted them. Consistently with these findings, in states that facilitate the foreclosure 
process the rate of foreclosure is higher (Clauretie, 1987) and the losses incurred by lenders are lower (Clauretie 
and Herzog, 1990). 
   17 
debt-GNP ratio, using cross-country data, and find that respect of the law “has a large and 
statistically significant effect on the size of the capital market” (p. 1145). Padilla and Requejo 
(2001) produce estimates that qualify those results, using the same basic data but also 
controlling for variables that capture macroeconomic stability. In these expanded 
specifications, the efficiency of judicial enforcement appears to have more significant effects 






Judicial inefficiency has high economic costs in credit markets. So far, these costs have never 
been measured. This paper takes a step in this direction by analyzing the effect of judicial 
efficiency on the availability and cost of credit, using a model of opportunistic debtors and 
inefficient courts. The model illustrates that improvements in judicial efficiency reduce credit 
rationing and increase the volume of lending. Interest rates can either increase or decrease, 
depending on the competitive structure of banks, on the specific channel through which 
judicial reforms improve lenders’ ability to repossess collateral, and on composition effects. 
For instance, greater judicial efficiency can open up the credit market to low-grade borrowers 
previously judged not creditworthy, and thereby raise the average default rate and the average 
interest rate. 
These theoretical predictions receive support from panel data on Italian provinces and 
international data on mortgage markets. We construct a panel of Italian provinces merging 
judicial and credit market data. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the provincial 
level, we find that where the backlog of pending trials is relatively large credit is less widely 
available, while the average interest rate and the default rate are lower.  
International data also reveal that the depth of mortgage markets and the availability 
of mortgage credit related inversely to the costs of foreclosure and directly to indicators of 
judicial efficiency, providing further evidence that judicial efficiency is associated with 
financial market deepening and more abundant credit.   18 
Appendix 1: The Model with Endogenous Default 
 
Assume that the utility of entrepreneur i is: 
[] [] ) ( ) , 1 min( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( i p i V i c c i r i c i p i r i c i p i u - + - - + + - + + = f p  (A1) 
where the disutility of effort Vi(pi) is an entrepreneur-specific, increasing and convex function of the 
success rate pi. We assume that pi and ci are observable and that the terms of the contract can be 
conditioned upon them. Therefore the competitive interest rate charged to entrepreneur i reflects both. 
Entrepreneur i chooses his effort level pi treating this interest rate ri as an exogenous parameter. The 
first-order condition of the problem is: 
[] [] 0 ) ( ) , 1 min( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ' = - + - - + - + + =
¶
¶
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The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied due to the convexity of Vi(pi). 
The competitive interest rate is given by: 
) , 1 min(
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=   (A4) 
is the minimum collateral that entrepreneur i must pledge to obtain credit. The higher the effort pi, the 
lower the minimum collateral. In contrast with the case with constant p analyzed in the text (where the 
marginal borrower is identified only by his collateral), here condition (A4) identifies a set of marginal 
borrowers. All entrepreneurs with collateral ci and success rate pi that satisfy equation (A4) are 
marginal borrowers. 
Replacing the competitive interest rate (A3) in the first-order condition (A2), one obtains the 
equilibrium success rate of any entrepreneur i: 
p + =1 ) ( '
i i p V  (A5) 
irrespective of whether  i cc f  is smaller or larger than  i r + 1 . Condition (A5) establishes that, at the 
individual level, the equilibrium success rate depends only on project profitability and on preferences, 
and not on judicial efficiency. However, an increase in judicial efficiency can affect the average 
success rate via composition effects, depending on the prevalence of credit rationing prior to the   19 
reform. From condition (A4), an increase in fc or in fp reduces the minimum required collateral cmin,i 
(given pi) or, alternatively, reduces the minimum required effort pi (given cmin,i). Thus, a new group of 
borrowers will gain access to credit: they feature lower ci, lower pi or both. It follows that the average 
default rate of the pool of borrowers increases, whenever some borrowers were credit-rationed before 
the judicial reform. If, instead, no entrepreneurs were credit-rationed (ci > cmin,i for all i), then the 
average default rate remains unchanged. 
  The interest rate charged to each individual borrower i rises along with his default rate. To see 
this, notice that the interest rate charged to entrepreneur i is a decreasing function of his probability of 
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Appendix 2: Provincial Data 
 
Credit market data are available for 95 Italian provinces for the period 1984-95. The data are drawn 
from the Centrale dei Rischi database. The Centrale dei Rischi is the Italian central credit register, 
managed by a department of the Bank of Italy. Between 1984 and 1995 it recorded data on each loan 
over 80 million lire (approximately Euro 40,000) granted by Italian banks to companies and 
individuals. These data are compulsorily filed by banks and made available upon request to individual 
banks to monitor the total exposure of their customers.  In addition, 88 banks (accounting for over 70 
percent of total bank lending) have agreed to file detailed information about the interest rates charged 
on each loan. These data, which are collected for monitoring purposes, are highly confidential. 
 
Judicial data are available from 1984 to 1998 for 27 judicial districts. Each district is defined by the 
jurisdiction of an appeal's court and comprises one or more provinces. Table 5 reports the matching of 
provinces and judicial districts. Below we report the definition and source of the variables used in the 
estimation. 
 
Length of trials, by judicial district (1984-98). Interval between the date of initial filing of a civil 
action and the date of the sentence, for actions requiring adjudication of substantive rights concerning 
the following matters: loans, sale of real estate or goods, rentals, negotiable and quasi-negotiable 
instruments, and insurance. Source: data kindly provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics 
(ISTAT). 
 
Stock of pending trials, by judicial district (1985-98). Number of pending civil trials, based on actions 
requiring adjudication of substantive rights and scaled by the population of the corresponding district. 
Source: Annuario Statistico dei Procedimenti Giudiziari Civili, various years, Italian National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT). 
 
Loans granted, by province (1984-95). Total credit granted to domestic companies for loans above 80 
millions lire. Source: Centrale dei Rischi. 
 
Credit rationing, by province (1985-95). Proportion of credit lines overdraft (loans for which credit 
actually drawn exceeds credit granted) for a set of non-financial companies. The companies are those 
that are also present in the Company Account Data Service Centrale dei Bilanci, covering 
approximately 30,000 companies each year. Source: Centrale dei Rischi. 
 
Lending rate, by province (1984-95). Lending rate on short-term loans in domestic currency to 
domestic companies, for a sample of 88 banks that reports on quarterly lending rates on loans 
exceeding 80 million lire. Data are aggregated by province weighting interest rates by loan size. 
Annual data are computed as averages of quarterly data. Source: Centrale dei Rischi. 
 
Non-performing loans, by province (1984-95). Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in 
domestic currency to domestic companies. Annual data are computed as averages of quarterly data. 
Source: Centrale dei Rischi. 
 
Herfindhal index, by province (1985-95). The index is the sum of squared market shares of loans of all 
banks in each province. Source: Centrale dei Rischi. 
 
Real GDP, by province (1985-95). Source: Banca d’Italia estimates based on data from Istituto 
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Table 1 
 
Panel of Italian Provinces: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table reports unweighted period averages of the variables used in the regression analysis. See Appendix 2 












Length of trials, months  30.00  40.08  44.15 
Stock of pending trials, per thousand inhabitants  23.55    29.61   34.98 
Loans granted/GPD, percent  31.23  39.75  40.67 
Credit overdrafts, percent  11.48   15.23  19.44 
Lending rate, percent  17.79  15.42    14.97  
T-bill rate, percent  12.80  12.50  11.23 
Non-performing loans/GDP, percent  2.34  1.24  2.14 
Herfindhal index, percent  17.33    15.59    15.29   
Real GDP (trillion of lire)  11.34  12.54  12.61 
Number of observations  380  380  380 
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Table 2 
 
Panel of Italian Provinces: Regression Analysis 
 
The dependent variables are the ratio of loans to GDP, an indicator of credit rationing (the fraction of loans for 
which credit used exceeds 100 percent of credit granted), the spread between the lending rate and the T-bill rate, 
and the ratio of values of non-performing loans to total loans. All variables are in percent. Each regression is 
estimated with a full set of year dummies. The sample consists of observations for 95 provinces from 1984 to 
1995. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
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Housing Finance, Costs and Duration of Housing Mortgage Foreclosure, and Efficiency 
of the Judicial System: International Comparison 
 
Outstanding mortgage loans over GDP are 1986-96 averages. Annual outstanding loans against mortgages in 
residential property is based on Table 14 in EU Mortgage Federation - Hypostat 1986-96 (1997) and annual 
GDP from IMF Financial Statistics. The downpayment ratio is the 1970-1995 average of minimum 
downpayment ratios for first-time buyers. The sources are Jappelli and Pagano (1994), EC Mortgage Federation 
(1996) and Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998). Data refer to 1981-97. The interest rate spread is the 
average interest rate on mortgage loans less the corresponding long-term rate. Interest rates on mortgage loans 
are drawn from Hypostat 1986-96, Table 21. Long-term interest rates are drawn from OECD (1996). Data refer 
to 1986-96, except for Finland and Sweden (1990-96), Luxembourg (1986-87) and Spain (1993-96). Efficiency 
of the judicial system is an assessment of the entire legal environment as it affects business taken from the 
country-risk agency Business International Corporation. It is an average of 1980-83 and the scale goes from 0 to 
10, with lower scores indicating lower efficiency levels. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). Legal expenses as 
percentage of the price of the mortgaged house and duration of housing mortgage foreclosure refer to 1990 and 
are drawn from European Mortgage Federation (1996). Data for duration in Austria, Canada, Luxembourg, and 


































Australia  19.30  20.0  n.a. 10 n.a.  n.a. 
Austria  4.24 30.0 1.52   9.5  13  n.a. 
Belgium 20.08  22.5  1.02  9.5  24  16-23 
Canada 41.32  22.5  n.a.  9.25  4.75  n.a. 
Finland   32.35  17.5  1.23  10  n.a.  n.a. 
France 22.02  20  0.95  8  10-12  12-18 
Germany 28.92  27.5  1.10  9  12-18  6 
Italy 5.49  42  1.47  6.75  36-60  18-20 
Luxembourg 25.61 40 -1.02 n.a.  12  2 
Netherlands 43.29  25 0.41 10 2-3 11 
Spain 15.01  20  -2.30  6.25  36  5-15 
Sweden   56.50  15  0.20  10  n.a.  n.a. 
United  Kingdom  51.87 9  1.08 10  12 4.75 
United States  43.61  15.5  1.60  10  9  n.a. 
 




International Comparison of Mortgage Markets: Correlation Matrix 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix between indicators of housing finance (mortgage loans, downpayment 
ratios and interest rate spreads) and indicators of judicial efficiency (efficiency of judicial system, duration of 
mortgage foreclosure, and legal expenses as a percent of the mortgaged house price). The countries analyzed are 
the 14 countries listed in Table 3. Because of missing data, some of the correlation coefficients are obtained with 
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Matching Judicial Districts and Provinces 
 
The table reports the matching of judicial districts with the Italian provinces. The source is ISTAT, Annuario dei 
Procedimenti Giudiziari Civili, 1996. 
 
Judicial districts  Corresponding regions and provinces  Population in judicial districts in 1994 
    
Turin  Piedmont (all provinces), Valle d’Aosta  4,417,412 
Milan  Milan, Como, Varese, Pavia, Sondrio  6,196,412 
Brescia  Brescia, Bergamo ,Cremona, Mantua  2,704,486 
Trento  Trentino-Alto Adige (all provinces)  906,387 
Venice  Veneto (all provinces)  4,418,139 
Trieste  Friuli-Venezia Giulia (all provinces)  1,860,380 
Genoa  Liguria (all provinces) and Massa-Carrara  1,191,768 
Bologna  Emilia Romagna (all provinces)  3,922,564 
Florence  Tuscany (all provinces excluding Massa Carrara)  3,326,434 
Perugia  Umbria (all provinces)  820,529 
Ancona  Marche (all provinces)  1,440,435 
Rome  Lazio (all provinces)  5,189,728 
L’Aquila  Abruzzo (all provinces)  1,262,802 
Campobasso  Molise (all provinces)  331,776 
Naples  Naples, Avellino, Benevento, Caserta  4,633,197 
Salerno Salerno  1,080,545 
Bari Bari,  Foggia  2,248,896 
Lecce  Lecce, Brindisi, Taranto  1,820,197 
Potenza  Basilicata (all provinces)  610,082 
Catanzaro Catanzaro,  Cosenza  1,500,461 
Reggio di Cal.  Reggio Calabria  578,837 
Palermo  Palermo, Agrigento, Trapani  2,147,955 
Messina Messina  665,591 
Caltanisetta Caltanissetta,  Enna  443,664 
Catania  Catania, Ragusa, Siracusa,  1,793,745 
Cagliari Cagliari,  Oristano  1,068,333 
Sassari Sassari,  Nuoro  589,765 
    
All districts    57,170,57 
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Figure 1 
 



















An increase in recoverable inside collateral ( p f ) under competition 
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Figure 5 
 
Indicators of Judicial Efficiency 
 
 The graphs display the average length of ordinary civil trials (in months) and the stock of pending 
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Figure 6 
 
Indicators of Judicial Efficiency, by Region 
 
The graphs display the average length of ordinary civil trials (in months) and the stock of pending civil 
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Figure 7 
 
Comparison between ISTAT and Banks' Reported Measures of Judicial Efficiency 
 
The figures plot the self-reported length of trials against the ISTAT measure of the length of trial and 
of the stock of pending trials, respectively. The self-reported length of trial is drawn from a 1994 
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Figure 8 
 




















     













































     





























Venice  36 
Figure 9 
 


























     


















































     




























Venice  37 
Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
 



























     

















































     




























Venice  39 
Figure 12 
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Figure 14 
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